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THE RIGHT OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO
APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES.
MICHAEL VON MOSCHZISKER t
AND
JAMES P. GARLAND 1
THE SUPREME COURT of the United States has held that no
constitutional right is abridged if a state appeals from a judgment of
not guilty following a criminal prosecution.' The appeal may even fol-
low a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime where the state sought a convic-
tion of a more heinous crime calling for a more severe penalty. The
breadth of this doctrine is somewhat astounding when compared
with the limits imposed upon such appeals within the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania. Numerous Pennsylvania cases reiterate the
principle which was stated most effectively in Commonwealth v.
Obenreder,2 that no appeal in favor of the commonwealth will lie and
no new trial will be granted after a verdict by a jury and a judgment in
a criminal trial. In the above mentioned case, the court stated:
"It is well settled in this state that the Commonwealth cannot
appeal from a judgment of acquittal in criminal prosecutions,
except in cases of nuisance, forcible entry and detainer, and forcible
detainer (Act of May 19, 1874 P. L. 219). And this is so
whether the prosecution be by indictment (citations omitted) or
by summary proceeding (citations omitted). And, if the former,
it does not matter whether the verdict be rendered by the jury of
its own accord or by direction of the court (citations omitted).
Such a verdict or judgment of acquittal is not to be confused with
the quashing of an indictment, or an arrest of judgment following
a verdict of guilty, or a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the
evidence, which raise only questions of law, and do not result
in a verdict of not guilty, or judgment of acquittal, and, ac-
cordingly in those cases the Commonwealth may appeal." 8
This doctrine is followed in some degree by the great majority
of the states, with Connecticut standing as a notable exception.
t Lecturer in Law, Villanova University. A.B., 1940, Yale University; LL.B.,
1947, University of Pennsylvania. Formerly, First Assistant District Attorney of
Philadelphia; now engaged in private practice in Philadelphia.
t Third-year student, Villanova University School of Law. A.B., 1953, Loyola
College (Baltimore).
1. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
2. 144 Pa. Super. 253, 19 A.2d 197 (1941).
3. 144 Pa. Super. 253, 255, 19 A.2d 197, 198 (1941).
(36)
1
Moschzisker and Garland: The Right of the Commonwealth to Appeal in Criminal Cases
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956
JANUARY 1956] RIGHT OF COMMONWEALTH TO APPEAL 37
It can be seen that there are numerous instances in the conduct
of a criminal trial where the decision rests not on the verdict of a
jury but purely on questions of law. In some of these instances the
commonwealth has a clear right to appeal; in others that right may
be doubtful, but has not been clearly prohibited. Except for the
specific instances in which an appeal is allowed by the Act of May 19,
1874," - as outlined in the above quoted opinion, the courts of Pennsyl-
vania have limited the right of the commonwealth to appeal to cases
involving "error in quashing an indictment, arresting judgment after
verdict of guilty, and the like" (emphasis added).' Examination re-
veals that in each of these instances the right to appeal has been subject
to some limitation, and there is no complete agreement as to what is in-
cluded in the term "and the like." This article will present, in a some-
what tabular form, the general rules and the limitations applicable to
each of the instances in which the commonwealth has sought review in
criminal trials.
A.
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER QUASHING AN INDICTMENT.
Where, in a criminal case, an order is entered, quashing an indict-
ment, and that order involves purely a question of law, the common-
wealth may appeal.7 Of course, no appeal may be taken from an order
which is not final; but the order is considered final even if it is coupled
with a direction that the defendant give bail for his appearance at the
next term.' It should be remembered that a motion to quash an in-
dictment for matters dehors the record is addressed to the discretion
of the court, and in such cases, although the commonwealth may ap-
peal, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed except for clear
error or obvious abuse of discretion. 9
4-5. This statute states, in pertinent part, 19 P.S. 1188:
". .. in cases charging the offense of nuisance, or forcible entry and detainer,
or forcible detainer, exceptions to any decision or ruling of the court may also be
taken by the Commonwealth, and writs of error or certiorari, as hereinbefore
provided, may be issued from the Supreme Court to all criminal courts."
6. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405, 411, 6 Atd. 685, 689 (1886).
7. Commonwealth v. Cohen, 142 Pa. Super. 199, 15 A.2d 730 (1940) ; The
Commonwealth v. Church, 1 Pa. 105 (1845); The Commonwealth v. McKisson,
8 S.&R. 420 (Pa. 1822). Cf., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 165 A.2d
498 (1933) ; Commonwealth v. Kolsky, 11 Pa. Super. 596 (1930). The common-
wealth may also appeal from an order quashing an information. Commonwealth v.
Hallberg, 168 Pa. Super. 596, 81 A.2d 270 (1951), reversed on other grounds, 374
Pa. 554, 97 A.2d 849 (1953).
8. Commonwealth v. Gouger, 21 Pa. Super. 217 (1902); Commonwealth v.
Bartilson, 85 Pa. 482 (1872); see also, 45 A.L.R. 470(n).
9. Commonwealth v. Ross, 58 Pa. Super. 412 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Carlucci,
48 Pa. Super. 72 (1911) ; Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 20 Pa. Super. 417 (1902).
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol1/iss1/6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
B.
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT.
An order arresting judgment after a verdict of guilty is sub-
ject to appeal by the commonwealth.'" However, the evidence in
the lower court is not part of the record on appeal," even if the de-
fendant submitted a point for binding instructions. 2  It is within
the discretion of the trial court after arresting judgment to release
the defendant on bail, or to hold him to his own recognizance, or
to discharge him sine die pending an appeal when the District At-
torney announces his intention to appeal; this action by the trial court
is not reviewable except for gross abuse of discretion."
The commonwealth does not waive its right to appeal from an
order arresting judgment by an unsuccessful attempt to convict the
defendant under a new indictment for the same offense. In Common-
wealth v. Heikes 1' the defendant had been indicted and tried in Cum-
berland County for fornication and bastardy. The jury returned a
special verdict that the fornication had been committed in York County
and the child had been born in Cumberland County. Judgment was
arrested on the ground that the indictment charged fornication in
Cumberland County and the jury found it to have been committed
in York County. The Cumberland County grand jury then returned
a true bill charging fornication in York County with the birth of the
child in Cumberland County. The defendant pleaded the former in-
dictment, the special verdict, and the arrest of judgment as a former
acquittal. The commonwealth demurred to this plea. Judgment was
given for the commonwealth and the defendant was sentenced. On
defendant's appeal, the judgment was reversed, and a new judgment
10. Commonwealth v. Kammerdiner, 165 Pa. 222, 30 Atd. 929 (1895); Common-
wealth v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 405, 6 Ati. 685 (1886); Commonwealth v. Moore, 99
Pa. 570 (1882) ; The Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binney 277 (Pa. 1812) ; Common-
wealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 68, 24 A.2d 460 (1942) ; Commonwealth v. Duchnicz,
59 Pa. Super. 527 (1941); Commonwealth v. Teman, 134 Pa. Super. 36, 3 A.2d
960 (1938); Commonwealth v. Short, 38 Pa. Super. 562 (1909), aff'd, 228 Pa. 279
(1910).
11. Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 68, 24 A.2d 460 (1942).
12. Commonwealth v. Pa. R.R., 72 Pa. Super. 353 (1919). This may have been
changed as a result of the Act of June 15, 1951, 19 P.S. § 871. Under that statute,
where judgment is arrested on the ground that the evidence is insufficient, it appears
that the commonwealth may appeal. In such case the evidence would logically have
to be part of the record. See Commonwealth v. Souder, 172 Pa. Super. 463, 94
A.2d 136 (1953), reversed in part, on other grounds, 376 Pa. 78, 101 A.2d 693 (1954).
13, Commonwealth v. Stetska, 69 Pa. Sfiper. 15 (1918) ; see Commonwealth v.
Bartilson, 85 Pa. 482, 490 (1872). In a case in which arrest of judgment was
granted and a new trial motion was not disposed of, the appellate court, when suc-
cessfully resorted to by the commonwealth, will remand the record for disposition of
the new trial motion. See Commonwealth v. Souder, 376 Pa. 78, 101 A.2d 693(1954) ; Cf., Commonwealth v. Pflaum, 48 Pa. Super. 370 (1911).
14. 26 Pa. 513 (1856).
[VOL. 1: p. 36
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was given discharging defendant sine die on that indictment; the
court holding that the defendant could have been sentenced for for-
nication and bastardy on the facts as found in the special verdict at
the first trial, and, therefore, he could not again be indicted and tried
for the same offense." Meanwhile, the commonwealth, in addition
to bringing defendant to trial on the second indictment, had appealed
by writ of error the order arresting judgment in the first proceeding.
The Superior Court reversed with directions that defendant be sen-
tenced on the special verdict under the first indictment. The court
held that the second prosecution did not constitute a waiver of the
right to appeal.
C.
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER SUSTAINING A DEMURRER
TO THE EVIDENCE.
It is clear that appeals from orders sustaining demurrers to the
evidence fall within that nebulous area referred to as "the like."
In Commonwealth v. Kocher 16 for example, an appeal from an order
sustaining defendant's demurrer to the evidence on an indictment
charging malicious mischief was allowed, and the order was reversed.
However, the appeal in such cases may not be used to test the pro-
priety of the lower court's exclusion of evidence offered by the com-
monwealth. The order can only be judged on the evidence which was
received.17
It is important to note that the proper procedure for the trial
judge on sustaining a demurrer to the evidence is to discharge the
defendant."8 If, however, the judge does not discharge the defendant
but incorrectly directs the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, that
verdict is binding, and since the defendant will then have been ac-
quitted by the jury, the commonwealth cannot appeal. 9 In Common-
wealth v. Kerr the court stated:
15. Although double jeopardy, the grounds on which the court here rested, is
only applicable in capital cases today, the question arises as to whether, on the
authority of Commonwealth v. Heikes, one may again be tried for first degree murder
after judgment arrested. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 165 Atd.
498 (1933).
It should also be noted here that, generally, an order vacating sentence on the
ground that the indictment does not charge an indictable offense is similar to one
arresting judgment, and is appealable. Commonwealth v. Bienkowski, 137 Pa. Super.
474, 9 A.2d 169 (1939) ; see, generally, Commonwealth v. Moore, 99 Pa. 570 (1882).
16. 162 Pa. Super. 605, 60 A.2d 385 (1948).
17. Commonwealth v. Frank, 159 Pa. Super. 604, 49 A.2d 521 (1946).
18. See Commonwealth v. Marino, 142 Pa. Super. 327, 330, 16 A.2d 314 (1940);
Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 68, 83, 24 A.2d 460 (1942).
19. Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa. Super. 598, 29 A.2d 340 (1942).
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" . Since the Act of June 5, 1937, P. L. 1703, 19 P. S.
§ 481,"0 the court on a demurrer to the evidence must act upon it
and either sustain it or overrule it . . . If the facts and infer-
ences therefrom thus admitted do not support a finding of guilty
and judgment thereon, it is the duty of the court to sustain the
demurrer and discharge the defendant (citations omitted). The
jury then has no further function to perform (citations omitted).
If the demurrer is sustained and the defendant discharged, the
Commonwealth may then appeal (citations omitted). The court
below, however, after sustaining the demurrer did not discharge
the defendant, but directed the jury to return a verdict of not
guilty. While this procedure was incorrect, the result of a verdict
of not guilty is that the Commonwealth is precluded from appeal-
ing from the judgment of not guilty." 21
The reasoning which underlies the allowance of an appeal in cases
involving demurrers to the evidence is that in such cases no question
of fact could be before the appellate court. On a demurrer to the evi-
dence, every fact which the jury could infer in favor of the party offer-
ing it, is to be considered as admitted and is part of the record.22
Nevertheless, every order sustaining a demurrer to the evidence in-
volves a finding that facts sufficient to show guilt have not been proved.
This necessarily means there will be a consideration of the evidence on
appeal.' The decision in Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum 24 complicates
this. Philadelphia's old vice-squad, departing from its ordinary chore
of chastening homosexuals and gamblers, raided a number of reputable
local book stores in an attempt to censor Philadelphia's reading matter.
At a trial without a jury on the charge of exhibiting obscene books,
a demurrer to the evidence filed by the defendant booksellers was sus-
tained. In his opinion the trial judge said the books were not porno-
graphic and were within the constitutional provisions protecting a free
press. On the commonwealth's appeal the judgment was affirmed.
The Superior Court said:
20. This Act provides:
"Hereafter, in all criminal prosecutions, the action of the defendant at the close
of the Commonwealth's case in demurring to the evidence submitted by the Com-
monwealth, shall not be deemed to be an admission of the facts which the evi-
dence tends to prove or the inferences reasonably deductible therefrom, except for
the purpose of deciding upon such demurrer, and if the court shall decide against
defendant on such demurrer, such decision shall be deemed interlocutory only,
and the case shall proceed as if no demurrer had been made."
21. 150 Pa. Super. 598, 29 A.2d 340 (1942).
22. Commonwealth v. Kolsky, 100 Pa. Super. 596 (1930).
23. Commonwealth v. Shiroff, 131 Pa. Super. 565, 200 A.2d 204 (1938).
24. 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
[VOL. 1: p. 36
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"Being bound by the factual inferences made by the trial
judge, all of which were drawn in favor of the defendants, we
are compelled to affirm. ,, 25
It is difficult to see why the Superior Court was any more bound
by the factual inferences drawn by the trial judge than it would be
in any other case in which a demurrer to the evidence is sustained.
The Superior Court has stated that a defendant who has judgment
in his favor on his demurrer to the evidence is in a situation similar
to that of a defendant who has a determination in his favor after the
filing of a special verdict by which the facts are put on record and the
law is submitted to the court.2" The court has described the situation
in this manner:
"In criminal cases demurrer to the evidence of the Common-
wealth admits all the facts which the evidence tends to prove, and
all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. The court
in such cases is not the trier of the facts." 27
This does not lead to the conclusion that the appellate court should be
bound by the inferences of the trial court, but rather would seem to
indicate that the opposite is true.
D.
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.
One of the most doubtful areas concerning the question of the com-
monwealth's right to appeal is that involving an order granting a new
trial. In Commonwealth v. Pflaum 28 it was assumed without further
discussion that such an order is not subject to appeal, since it does not
result in a final judgment. But in Commonwealth v. Supansic, which
involved an appeal from an order granting a new trial after a verdict
of guilty of extortion, the court, while upholding the order, stated:
"It cannot properly be said that an order granting a new
trial is, as a general proposition, kindred to one quashing an in-
dictment or arresting judgment. . . When we consider the
variety of grounds upon which new trials have been and may be
ordered, we are not prepared to hold that the Commonwealth can
never appeal from such an order, but we are of opinion that there
is no warrant in any statute or controlling decision for this ap-
peal, and that it should therefore be dismissed." 29
25. 166 Pa. Super. 120, 121, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
26. Commonwealth v. Kolsky, 100 Pa. Super. 596 (1930).
27. Commonwealth v. Parr, 5 W. & S. 345 (Pa. 1843).
28. 48 Pa. Super. 370 (1911).
29. 93 Pa. Super. 111 (1927).
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In Commonwealth v. Antonini," an appeal was allowed from an
order granting a new trial, but this was done in a situation where the
trial judge had certified that the new trial was granted solely on a
question of law, and both defendant and prosecutor had concurred in
seeking the appeal. The court deliberately avoided discussion of the
commonwealth's general right to appeal, stating:
"Because of the importance of this case and those related
to it, and the fact that the Department of Justice of the Common-
wealth conducted the prior investigation, participated in the trial,
argued this appeal, and since defense counsel concurred, we will
not discuss the right of the Commonwealth to appeal, and follow
literally Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 383, 165 A.
498." 31
In the Simpson case the court had permitted the commonwealth
to appeal where the question ruled against the commonwealth had been
one purely of law. The importance of the judge's certification in the
Antonini case stems from the fact that the most frequent objection
to appeals from orders granting new trials is that such appeals are con-
cerned primarily with questions of the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion.3 2 Even in a civil case, an appeal will not be successful
where a new trial has been granted in the exercise of a general dis-
cretion. 3  However, rulings which have based a refusal to grant an
appeal from such an order on the fact that an exercise of discretion
is involved, lead to the inference that an appeal would lie for an abuse
of that discretion. Yet, no case has been found allowing an appeal
from such an order, except in the unusual situation present in the
Antonini case, supra.
E.
APPEAL FROM ORDERS INVOLVING PLEAS OF FORMER
JEOPARDY OR AUTREFOIS ACQUIT.
Where the defendant pleads former jeopardy, and the common-
wealth's demurrer thereto is overruled, it is generally conceded that
the commonwealth may appeal. This point is concretely stated in
Commonwealth v. Simpson. 5 The defendant had been indicted for
30. 165 Pa. Super. 498, 69 A.2d 177 (1949).
31. 165 Pa. Super. 498, 503, 69 A.2d 177, 179 (1949).
32. Commonwealth v. Dolan, 155 Pa. Super. 453, 38 A.2d 508 (1944).
33. Weinfeld v. Funk, 342 Pa. 160, 20 A.2d 206 (1941) ; Commonwealth v. Dolan,
155 Pa. Super. 453, 38 A.2d 508 (1944).
34. Commonwealth v. Dellcese, 155 Pa. Super. 120, 38 A.2d 494 (1944) ; see,
also, Commonwealth v. Dolan, supra n.32.
35. 310 Pa. 380, 165 A.2d 498 (1933).
[VOL. 1: p. 36
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murder. He was brought to trial, and a jury was sworn, but it was
discharged before verdict without the acquiescence of the defendant.
In a subsequent trial for murder on the same facts, the commonwealth's
demurrer to defendant's plea of former jeopardy was overruled, and
the commonwealth appealed. In sustaining the right of appeal in the
face of numerous authorities to the contrary, the court stated:
"The criminal law must move forward to meet the new con-
ditions which confront organized society if its law-abiding mem-
bers are to be protected in their personal and property rights.
Whatever the rule may have been in past decades, we think now
when there is such wide latitude allowed those convicted of crime
to appeal and have their convictions reviewed, there should be
a liberalizing ofthe attitude towards the Commonwealth, where
the defendant has been convicted, and the question ruled against
the Commonwealth, as here, is purely one of law. . . . Our
determination, therefore, is that the Commonwealth has the right
to appeal." "
In Commonwealth v. Danis"T the trial court, in response to a
plea of former acquittal, had removed a juror and directed the District
Attorney to enter a nolle prosequi. The Superior Court, relying on
Commonwealth v. Sobel"3 held that, there being no question as to
the identity of the defendant, the commonwealth had the right of appeal.
In the Sobel case, like the Danis case, the indictment and trial were
for arson. On the grounds that all the material facts were undisputed
and that only questions of law were before the court on appeal, the
Superior Court was of the opinion that the appeal was from one of
those situations "like" an order quashing an indictment or arresting
judgment, and hence the appeal was allowed. Such an appeal will also
be allowed where the trial court has first overruled the commonwealth's
demurrer to the plea of autrefois acquit, then sustained the plea and
discharged the defendant."
In view of the foregoing cases, and especially in view of the broad
language in Commonwealth v. Simpson,"' the commonwealth has the
36. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 383, 165 A.2d 498 (1933). For a
contrary view of this point, see Hilands v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl. 70 (1885),
which was in part overruled by the opinion in Commonwealth v. Simpson. In the
Hilands case the court determined that an arraignment and conviction of first degree
murder after a jury had been sworn and then discharged by the trial judge, involved
double jeopardy. See, also, Commonwealth v. Balles, 163 Pa. Super. 467, 62 A.2d
91 (1948).
37. 130 Pa. Super. 597, 198 Atl. 183 (1938).
38. 94 Pa. Super. 525 (1928).
39. Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 84 Pa. 65 (1877); Cf., Commonwealth v.
Bergen, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A.2d 64 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Biederman, 109 Pa.
Super. 70, 165 A.2d 765 (1933) ; Commonwealth v. Sobel, 94 Pa. Super. 525 (1928).
40. 310 Pa. 380, 165 A.2d 498 (1933).
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right to appeal from any order sustaining a plea of autrefois convict
or autrefois acquit, and from any order overruling the commonwealth's
demurrer to a plea of former jeopardy, as long as no question of fact
is presented.
F.
APPEAL BY THE COMMONWEALTH FROM THE SUPERIOR
COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT.
In numerous situations the commonwealth has been allowed to
appeal from an adverse decision of the Superior Court to the Supreme
Court, as long as only questions of law are involved."' In several of
these situations the Supreme Court has been even more careful than
usual to point out the special circumstances under which the appeal
was granted. For example, in Commonwealth v. Vallone,4 the court
stated that the appeal was allowed because the case involved the proper
interpretation and application of a rule of evidence which the court
considered to be of extreme importance in its effects upon methods of
criminal investigation by law enforcement officers. Likewise, in Coln-
monwealth v. Zasloff,' a case involving an alleged violation of the
then Fair Sales Act, the Supreme Court allowed the commonwealth's
appeal for the express purpose of determining the constitutionality of
the statute.
Where an appeal is allowed, the Supreme Court may directly
reinstate the verdict and judgment of the court of quarter sessions, 44
and this is the more normal procedure. Even where the Superior Court
has discharged defendant sine die, the Supreme Court is not precluded
from ruling and reinstating the trial court's verdict. This situation
was fully discussed in Commonwealth v. Greevy, where the court
stated :
Section 9 of the Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 217, which
provides that on appeals from the Superior Court 'the whole
proceeding shall be brought thereby within the jurisdiction and
power of the Supreme Court, who may enter therein such judg-
ment, order or decree as may be just, except -that it may not in-
41. Commonwealth v. Disanto, 285 Pa. 1, 131 Atl. 489 (1925), reversed on other
grounds, 273 U.S. 34 (1926); Commonwealth v. Greevy, 271 Pa. 95, 114 Atl. 511
(1921); Commonwealth v. Hilton, 265 Pa. 353, 108 Atl. 828 (1919). Logically,
appeals from Superior Court orders granting new trials ought to be governed by the
same rules as appeals from trial court orders granting new trials.
42. 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943).
43. 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940); see, also, Commonwealth v. Hallberg, 374
Pa. 554, 97 A.2d 849 (1953).
44. Commonwealth v. Disanto, 285 Pa. 1, 131 AtI. 489 (1925), rev'd on other
grounds, 273 U.S. 34 (1926).
[VOL. 1: p. 36
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crease (although it may reverse) a sentence upon an indictment.'
This decides adversely to defendant the question last referred
to.
[Since the Superior Court] correctly decided that the evi-
dence in the murder trial is not before us, we can, therefore, con-
sider only the record proper, which consists of the indictment,
the pleadings, the issue thereby formed, and the verdict." '
The defendant had entered a plea of autrefois acquit on the trial,
and this plea was not sustained. On appeal, the Superior Court sus-
tained the plea and discharged defendant sine die. In reversing this
decision of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court held that, although
the defendant had been acquitted of felonious homicide, this did not
preclude the commonwealth from establishing from the same facts
the lesser crime of involuntary manslaughter.
G.
APPEALS BY THE COMMONWEALTH FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
BY A MAGISTRATE OR A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.
Appeals of this nature generally fall into three classes:
(1) Appeal from a judgment of acquittal.
(2) Appeal from a decision of the court of common pleas dis-
charging defendant on certiorari after a summary conviction
by a magistrate or justice of the peace.
(3) Appeal from an order of the court of quarter sessions finding
defendant not guilty on a hearing de novo after an appeal by
defendant from a conviction by a magistrate or a justice of
the peace.
In the first class, the commonwealth has, without objection, appealed
to the court of quarter sessions, and when it received an adverse judg-
ment there, has appealed to the Superior Court.4" In cases wherein the
court of common pleas has discharged the defendant after a summary
conviction, the commonwealth is also entitled to appeal.4
However, the law is unsettled as to those appeals which fall into
the third category. Early decisions established the rule that the com-
monwealth may appeal where the acquittal resulted from an erroneous
45. 271 Pa. 95, 98, 99, 114 Atl. 511 (1921).
46. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 32 Pa. Super. 544 (1907).
47. Commonwealth v. Borden, 61 Pa. 272 (1869); Commonwealth v. Burkhart,
23 Pa. 521 (1854); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 146 Pa. Super. 328, 22 A.2d 299
(1941).
10
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construction of the penal statute involved,4" or from a decision of the
court of quarter sessions that the statute was unconstitutional.4 9 In
such cases it seems to be within the discretion of the appellate court
whether a judgment should be entered against defendant where such
an appeal is sustained, or whether a procedendo should issue.5"
The scope of appeals in such cases has been considered to be very
narrow. In Commonwealth v. Janower,5 1 the Superior Court held that
on an appeal from the judgment of a court of quarter sessions reversing
a summary conviction after a hearing de novo, and entering judgment
for defendant, the evidence is not part of the record and the appellate
court will only consider whether or not the lower court was within
the limits of its jurisdiction and proceeded with regularity according
to law.52
Another line of cases " indicates that the commonwealth can not
appeal. In Commonwealth v. Bertolette 54 the Superior Court quashed
an appeal of the commonwealth from a judgment of the court of quar-
ter sessions which had found defendant not guilty on the ground that
the rule, for violation of which he had been convicted by a justice of
the peace, was void. The court held that no appeal lies from a judg-
ment of not guilty entered by a quarter sessions court after a hearing
de novo on appeal from a summary conviction by a justice of the
peace." In 1935, in Commonwealth v. Peacock,56 the court further
48. Commonwealth v. Forrest, 170 Pa. 40, 32 Atd. 652 (1895).
49. Commonwealth v. Hazen, 20 Pa. Super. 487 (1902), rev'd on merits, 207
Pa. 52 (1903).
50. In Commonwealth v. Forrest, supra n.48, and Commonwealth v. McComb,
39 Pa. Super. 411 (1907), aff'd, per curiam, 227 Pa. 377 (1910), the lower court's
decision was reversed and judgment given by the appellate court, while in Common-
wealth v. Hazen, supra n.49, in a fact situation similar to that in Commonwealth v.
McComb, and in Commonwealth v. Immel, 33 Pa. Super. 388 (1907), the Superior
Court reversed with a procedendo.
51. 48 Pa. Super. 400 (1911).
52. In later cases, however, the evidence has been allowed as part of the record
for specific purposes. See Commonwealth v. Pahlman, 118 Pa. Super. 175, 179
Atl. 910 (1935), and Commonwealth v. Peacock, 118 Pa. Super. 168, 179 Atd. 907
(1935).
53. Commonwealth v. Bertoleite, 101 Pa. Super. 334 (1931); Commonwealth v.
Ahlgrim, 98 Pa. Super. 595 (1930); Commonwealth v. Benson, 94 Pa. Super. 10(1928); Commonwealth v. Preston, 92 Pa. Super. 159 (1927); see, also, Common-
wealth v. Long, 276 Pa. 154, 120 Atl. 125 (1923). Commonwealth v. Benson, supra,
is also authority for the proposition that only the Attorney General or the District
Attorney can appeal on behalf of the commonwealth. An appeal by the attorney for
a private prosecutor in the name of the commonwealth, without special allowance,
will be quashed. In the above-mentioned opinion, the court distinguished Common-
wealth v. Immel, supra n.50, on the ground that in that case the effect of the judgment
had been equivalent to an order quashing an indictment or arresting judgment.
54. 101 Pa. Super. 334 (1931).
55. The court cited in support of this proposition Commonwealth v. Benson,
supra n.53. See, also, City of Scranton v. Noll, 108 Pa. Super. 94, 164 AtI. 850(1933).
56. 118 Pa. Super. 168, 179 At. 907 (1935).
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discussed this problem. The defendant, having been convicted and sen-
tenced by a magistrate for driving an overweight truck, appealed to
the quarter sessions court which entered an order "sustaining the
appeal," without having received any evidence. Upon the common-
wealth's appeal, the Superior Court reversed with directions that the
quarter sessions court hear the case de novo, and enter such judgment
as the law and evidence might require. Defendant's motion to quash
the appeal was denied. The court said that the appeal to it was in
the nature of a certiorari and was not a writ of error or an appeal
proper. In such instances according to the court's opinion the record
of the court below is before the appellate court, including, since the
Act of April 18, 1919,"7 the testimony taken in the court below for
the purpose of a limited review. What the court meant by this
may be questioned, since the act itself states that:
" . the appeal so taken shall not have the effect only of a
certiorari to review the regularity of the proceedings in the court
below." "
Nevertheless, the court went on to say that, although there is no
appeal from a judgment of not guilty in such cases:
. . on a trial by a judge without a jury in the court of
quarter sessions, it is his duty 'to try the case de novo, to hear
the evidence and arguments of counsel, to find the facts and
thereupon to enter such judgments as would be warranted by the
law and the evidence': Com. v. Brann, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 345.
And the judgment following such a trial should be 'Guilty' or
'Not Guilty'. A judgment affirming the justice of the peace, dis-
missing the appeal, or sustaining the appeal is not sufficient, but
will be reversed: Com. v. Brann, supra; Com. v. Congdon, 74 Pa.
Superior Ct. 286; Com. v. Oliver, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 580; Com.
v. Benson, supra; Com. v. Sesse, 95 Pa. Superior Ct. 552;
Manerville v. Flenner, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 246. And the Com-
monwealth may appeal from an order quashing a summary con-
viction: Com. v. Immel, 33 Pa. Superior Ct. 38; Com. v. Preston,
supra, p. 161." "
But, apparently, where there was a hearing on the evidence in
the court of quarter sessions, an appeal by the commonwealth, will
be quashed." °
57. P.L. 72 § 1 (1919), 12 P.S. § 1165 (1952).
58. Ibid.
59. Commonwealth v. Peacock, 118 Pa. Super. 168, 171, 179 Atl. 907 (1935).
60. Commonwealth v. Peacock, supra n.59. However, in Commonwealth v.
Pahlnan, 118 Pa. Super. 175, 179 Atl. 910 (1935), the Superior Court reversed on
appeal a judgment of the county court which had considered the evidence in an
overweight truck case.
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There is no uniformity whatever in the subsequent cases.6 ' The
most that can be said is that the latest case holds merely that the
commonwealth may appeal where the order of the court below in such
instances is based on a question of law, and not a determination of the
guilt or innocence of the parties. 2
H.
APPEALS FROM ORDERS QUASHING
SEARCH WARRANTS.
The commonwealth may appeal from an order of the court of
quarter sessions quashing a search warrant and directing that the
seized matter be returned to the defendants, provided the appeal is
based on that portion of the order directing that "the papers and
other articles seized thereunder be returned to the defendants." " The
rationale of this rule is that an order requiring officers to return seized
property terminates the prosecution and is therefore a final judgment
from which the commonwealth may appeal.64 It has been held, never-
theless, in an almost identical situation, that if the commonwealth bases
its appeal only on the portion of the order of the court directing
that the seized materials be suppressed as evidence the appeal will
not be allowed since that portion of the order does not dispose of the
prosecution. 5
I.
APPEAL FROM A VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.
The Act of May 19, 1874 66 provides that:
.. . in cases charging the offense of nuisance or forcible entry
and detainer, or forcible detainer, exceptions to any decision or
61. Commonwealth v. Hallinger, 170 Pa. Super. 180, 84 A.2d 794 (1951); Com-
monwealth v. Petersheim, 166 Pa. Super. 90, 70 A.2d 395 (1950), and Commonwealth
v. Teman, 134 Pa. Super. 36, 2 A.2d 960 (1938), are all consistent with Common-
wealth v. Peacock, supra n.59, whereas in Commonwealth v. Reitz, 156 Pa. Super.
122, 39 A.2d 522 (1944), and Commonwealth v. Wanamaker, 128 Pa. Super. 528,
194 At. 681 (1937), the right of the commonwealth to appeal seems to depend on
whether the judgment of not guilty in quarter sessions court was based on the alleged
unconstitutionality or invalidity of the statute or ordinance in question.
62. Commonwealth v. Hallberg, 168 Pa. Super. 596, 8 A.2d 270 (1951), reversed
on other grounds, 374 Pa. 554, 97 A.2d 849 (1953).
63. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 176 Pa. Super. 115, 106 A.2d 905 (1954).
64. Commonwealth v. Rich, 174 Pa. Super. 174, 100 A.2d 144 (1953).
65. Commonwealth v. Montanero, 173 Pa. Super. 133, 96 A.2d 178 (1953).
66. P.L. 219, § 1 (1874), 19 P.S. §1188 (1952).
[VOL. 1: p. 36
13
Moschzisker and Garland: The Right of the Commonwealth to Appeal in Criminal Cases
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956
JANUARY 1956] RIGHT OF COMMONWEALTH TO APPEAL 49
ruling of the court may also be taken by the Commonwealth, and
writs of error or certiorari, as hereinbefore provided, may be
issued from the supreme court to all criminal courts."
Except for the three instances pointed out by this statute, the
commonwealth may not appeal from a verdict and judgment of ac-
quittal, whether it be in cases involving felonies,"7 or merely misde-
meanors. 8 It does not matter whether the prosecution is by indict-
ment or summary proceedings; 69 and in prosecutions by indictment
there may be no appeal by the state whether the verdict was returned
by the jury of its own motion or pursuant to binding instructions.
Moreover, a verdict and judgment of acquittal obtained by fraud on the
court is nevertheless a bar to an appeal by the commonwealth, unless it
be found that the whole proceeding was a mere sham. 71  Perhaps
due to the fact that at common law the judge's charge to the jury was
not part of the record, no appeal is allowed even where error is as-
signed in the judge's charge to the jury.72  This is not surprising in
view of the fact that there can be no appeal from an acquittal even
where a jury has been waived. The verdict of a judge trying a case
without a jury pursuant to the Act of June 11, 1935 is a determination
of fact as well as of law, with the same effect as the verdict of a jury,
and if the defendant is acquitted, an appeal by the commonwealth will
not lie.73 It is well to note again that even where a judge incorrectly
directs a verdict of acquittal and the jury returns that verdict, an ap-
peal by the commonwealth will be quashed. 4 However, in Com-
monwealth v. Dudenhoeffer,"5 a case which stands alone, the common-
wealth successfully appealed from a directed verdict of not guilty
which followed an order sustaining, quite incorrectly, a plea of autrefois
67. Commonwealth v. Steimling, 156 Pa. 400, 27 Atd. 297 (1893).
68. Commonwealth v. Obenreder, 144 Pa. Super. 253, 19 A.2d 497 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Stillwagon, 13 Pa. Super. 547 (1900); Commonwealth v. Coble,
9 Pa. Super. 215 (1899).
69. Commonwealth v. Obenreder, 144 Pa. Super. 253, 19 A.2d 497 (1941);
Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa. Super. 598, 29 A.2d 340 (1942).
70. Commonwealth v. Steimling, supra n.67; Commonwealth v. Heiland, 110 Pa.
Super. 188, 167 Atd. 439 (1933); Commonwealth v. Tremeloni, 93 Pa. Super. 432
(1927) ; Commonwealth v. Weber, 66 Pa. Super. 180 (1917).
71. Commonwealth v. Kroekel, 121 Pa. Super. 423, 183 A.2d 749 (1936).
72. Commonwealth v. Stillwagon, 13 Pa. Super. 547 (1900); Commonwealth v.
Coble, 9 Pa. Super. 215 (1899).
73. Commonwealth v. Snaman, 131 Pa. Super. 383, 200 A.2d 106 (1938).
74. As stated supra, P. 39, if the court sustains a demurrer to the evidence, and
goes on to direct a verdict of not guilty, the effect is acquittal, and the common-
wealth may not appeal. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 150 Pa. Super. 604, 29 A.2d
343 (1942) ; Commonwealth v. Kerr, 150 Pa. Super. 598, 29 A.2d 340 (1942).
75. 105 Pa. Super. 254, 161 Atd. 426 (1932).
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acquit. 6  One proffered explanation for this is that the appeal was
really from an order overruling the commonwealth's demurrer to the
plea of autrefois acquit, rather tlan from the verdict of not guilty.
But the docket entries and the record as printed for use in the Superior
Court contradict that explanation; Commonwealth v. Dudenhoeffer "
remains a lonely exception among the numerous cases denying the
commonwealth the right to appeal from a verdict and judgment of
acquittal.
76. In this case the court held acquittal after directed verdict of not guilty of
bastardy, is no bar to a prosecution for neglecting to support the child resulting from
such illicit intercourse, since there was no identity of offense.
77. Supra n.75.
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